During last years poker has gained a lot of prestige in several countries and, beyond to be one of the most famous card games, it represents a modern challenge for scientists belonging to different communities, spanning from artificial intelligence to physics and from psychology to mathematics. Unlike games like chess, the task of classifying the nature of poker (i.e., as 'skill game' or gambling) seems really hard and it also constitutes a current problem, whose solution has several implications. In general, gambling offers equal winning probabilities both to rational players (i.e., those that use a strategy) and to irrational ones (i.e., those without a strategy). Therefore, in order to uncover the nature of poker, a viable way is comparing performances of rational versus irrational players during a series of challenges. Recently, a work on this topic revealed that rationality is a fundamental ingredient to succeed in poker tournaments. In this study we analyze a simple model of poker challenges by a statistical physics approach, with the aim to uncover the nature of this game. As main result we found that, under particular conditions, few irrational players can turn poker into gambling. Therefore, although rationality is a key ingredient to succeed in poker, also the format of challenges has an important role in these dynamics, as it can strongly influence the underlying nature of the game. The importance of our results lies on related implications, as for instance in identifying the limits poker can be considered as a 'skill game' and, as a consequence, which kind of format must be chosen to devise algorithms able to face humans.
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Nowadays, social dynamics and modeling human behavior represent challenging topics for scientists belonging to different communities, e.g., artificial intelligence, physics, mathematics and social psychology. Notably, the modern field of sociophysics [1] aims to investigate social and economic phenomena by a strongly interdisciplinary approach, mainly based on analytical and computational tools, coming from the framework of the statistical physics [2] [3] [4] . Moreover, several social issues as opinion formation, information spreading and social behaviors, can be represented and studied by using agent-based models [5, 6] often combined with the theory of network [7] [8] [9] [10] . In this work, we analyze poker games (hereinafter simply poker) by the framework of statistical physics (see also [11] ). Poker represents one of the major challenges for artificial intelligence and mathematics [12] [13] [14] [15] , and it is a topic of interest also for psychologists, economists and sociologists [16] due to its wide diffusion over several countries. One of the most controversial aspects of poker, caused by the utilization of money, is related to its nature, i.e., 'skill game' or gambling. The related answer has not yet been solved [17] , although it has a long list of social implications [18, 19] . Furthermore, all efforts made to define algorithms and strategies in the context of artificial intelligence are obviously based on the confident belief that computing skills are relevant to succeed in poker. Therefore, our investigations aim to shed some light on the nature of poker, by * marcojavarone@gmail.com an approach based on statistical physics. There are several variants of poker, e.g., Texas Hold'em, Omaha, Draw, etc., each having its own rules. However, they all follow a similar logic: a number of cards is distributed among players, who in turn decide if to play or not, evaluating the possible combinations of their cards (called hand ) with those on the table. Since players cannot see the cards of their opponents, when they have to take an action (e.g., to bet money), poker is an imperfect information game, unlike others like chess where all players get all the system information simultaneously [20] . It is worth to observe that the utilization of money makes the challenge meaningful, just because the underlying dynamics of poker are constituted by a series of bets. Hence, without money players would have no reasons to fold their hands. In general, there are two main formats for playing poker, i.e., tournament and 'cash game'. The former entails players pay an entry fee that goes into the prize pool plus a fee to play, receiving an amount of chips. Then, top players share the prize pool. Instead, playing poker in the 'cash game' format entails to use real money during the challenge. Therefore, in this last case, players can play until they have money and, although there are no entry fees to pay, a fraction of each pot is taxed (i.e., a small 'rake' is applied). In the work [21] , the author defined a model for representing poker challenges, focusing his attention on tournaments, in order to study the role of rationality. Remarkably, his main result was that the nature of poker does not depend on its rules but on the players's behavior, then identifying rationality as a key ingredient to arXiv:1503.08683v1 [physics.soc-ph] 30 Mar 2015 succeed. Therefore, since the human behavior has such important role in poker, we perform further investigations on this direction, but considering the 'cash game' format.
Let us now briefly recall the model described in [21] and summarize the main achievements. This model represents 'heads-up' challenges, i.e., challenges that involve two players at a time. Players can be rational or irrational. The former move (e.g., bet and fold) by using the Sklansky table [22] as reference, whereas the latter play randomly. It is worth to note that, for the sake of simplicity, each round is composed of only one betting phase (instead, in real scenarios, usually there are more phases [22] ). Numerical simulations showed that, under these conditions, rational players win a challenge against irrational players with probability P w r ∼ 0.8. Hence, a rational player is supposed to win about three consecutive challenges (W = 3) against an irrational one. As a consequence, since 'heads-up' tournaments have a tree-like structure, the final winner is a rational player when the number of total participants N , regardless of their behavior, is N ≤ 2 W . After analyzing poker tournaments by different conditions (e.g., also allowing rationals to change behavior), the author [21] states that the nature of poker depends on the players's behavior, but not on its rules.
Here, we focus our attention on the 'cash game' format. It is important observing that now each 'heads-up' challenge can lasts from 1 to n rounds, where the value of n depends on the amount of money opponents have available. Moreover, even after a single round one player can leave the table (i.e., ending the challenge) with her/his remaining money. In order to study this scenario, we consider a population of agents that interact by the dynamics of the classical voter model [23] . In so doing, each agent has a state that represents its behavior (i.e., rational or irrational) and, at each time step, two randomly chosen agents interact, i.e., they play a poker challenge. Furthermore, we assume that a rational player wins a full challenge against an irrational one with the probability P w r defined in [21] . Therefore, the stochastic process of a poker challenge, involving players x and y, is reduced to a coin flip with winning probabilities and P w y = 1 − P w x . Then, according to voter model-like dynamics, after each interaction the loser assumes the state (i.e., the behavior) of the winner. Finally, we analyze two different cases: a an interaction corresponds to a full challenge. Then, the loser is recharged to be able to play again if selected; b the interaction corresponds to only one round and, when an agent loses all its money, it is recharged. At the beginning of every challenge, full or partial (i.e., single round), agents have always the same amount of money. It is worth to highlight that both cases represent real scenarios. In particular, the case b represents the so called 'rush poker', available in several online platforms. Moreover, we highlight that for the case b Eq 1 cannot be used, since it holds only to a full challenge. Anyway, also for the case b, it would be possible to derive the winning probabilities for rational agents by analyzing the Sklansky table [22] .
Numerical simulations of the proposed model have been carried on populations of different size (from N = 100 to N = 1000 agents), mapping agent states as follows: σ = +1 for rational agents and σ = −1 for irrational agents. Since we aim to compare performances of rational versus irrational agents, each simulation lasted until all agents converged to the same behavior. Then it is possible to study the evolution of the system, for different initial densities of rational agents ρ r , by analyzing its magnetization [24] 
with N + representing the number of rational agents and N − that of irrational ones. We recall that the value of M ranges between 0 and 1 (i.e., 0 ≤ M ≤ 1). When M ∼ 0, the system is in a disordered phase as there is the same amount of agents in the two states, whereas as M → 1 the system reaches an ordered phase, characterized by the presence of a prevailing state (σ = +1 or σ = −1). Figure 1 shows the average magnetization over time, achieved in the two considered cases (i.e.,a and b). Notably, both varying the density ρ r and considering the two cases, the agent population always converges to the same state. At this point, it is worth to investigate the final population state (Σ), in order to know whether, after challenges, all agents play rationally (i.e., Σ = +1) or not (i.e., Σ = −1). Therefore, we analyze the amount of rational agents over time S(t), for different initial densities ρ r -see figure 2 . Remarkably, since values of S(t) are averaged over different simulation runs, and by knowing that at each attempt the population reaches an ordered phase, we may derive the probability that rational agents prevail on irrational ones on varying ρ r . Notably, these winning probabilities (indicated as P for the case b lies in the fact that, observing figure 2, we found that rational agents easily prevail playing full challenges (i.e., a) against irrational agents that, in turn, prevail many times playing single rounds (i.e., b). A fast inspection of all achieved results allows to appreciate a strong difference between challenges performed in the two cases. Notably, for low values of ρ r , in the case a, the magnetization initially decreases, and later it increases up to 1. This phenomenon is caused by the transition of several irrational agents to the rational behavior, as confirmed in panel a of figure 2. On the other hand, when agents play single rounds, the value of M only increases up to 1, revealing that there are no sensible transitions between the two states, when ρ r has both low and high initial values (see panel a of figure 1 ).
Furthermore, even the summation S(t) strongly differs in the two cases: when playing full challenges the population seems to reach always the same ordered 'rational' phase; instead, when playing single rounds, sometimes even few irrational agents can turn into irrational the whole population. Eventually, figure 3 further highlights the already detected differences between cases a and b. Notably, we computed fitness functions for both cases, identifying a simple step function for a, and the function when playing single rounds, rational agents prevail with a probability greater than 50% only if ρ r > 0.7.
All these results confirm that classifying the nature of poker is a tricky task, as a lot of conditions must be considered in real scenarios. In particular, although in tournaments it seems rationality be a key ingredient to succeed [25] , in the cash game format it may be sometimes appropriate to associate poker to gambling. Moreover, considering all risks of poker in the cash game format (see [25] ), we think both players and scientists working on poker be aware of our results. A further important point to discuss, before to conclude, is related to the validity of out model in real scenarios. Notably, although it would be extremely interesting to compare outcomes of the proposed model with real data, this is not possible as no similar datasets exist. Anyway it may be possible to evaluate if a player is adopting mainly a random strategy or a rational one as, according to the rules [22] , often players have to show their hands after the round to discover who is the winner. Finally, we deem the importance of our results lies on related implications. Notably, we found that not only the player's behavior but also the format of poker must be considered when classifying the nature of this game, showing that there are well defined limits poker can be considered as a 'skill game'.
